This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited. Table of Tables   Table No. ?ae I--2-about home sharing, i.e., their willingness to share their basement shelter with neighbors and/or strangers, and also their willingness to go to another person's home for shelter in case of a natural or nuclear disaster, (2) to identify those specific areas where public knowle, ge about behavioral alternatives in disaster planning appears to be seriously lacking, (3) to describe two main summary factors which seem to influence the level of disaster preparedness as reflected in family discussions about disaster planning, and (4) to make some suggestions about information "packages" that should alleviate these deficiencies.
The data base for the present report comes from two sources.
First, the information on "willingness to share home basement shelter" was obtained from 400 telephone interviews conducted in Phase I of the study. Next, we selected a subset of the original 400 interviews and went to 65 homes, where we interviewed both husband and wife together.
These interviews had ti-o parts: first, each member of the husband/wife pair completed a questionnaire describing a variety of their communication behaviors, including their sources for receiving information about disaster-related topics. Then, each couple was presented with four different topics and asked to spend up to 15 minutes together discussing each one. Two of the topics were related to civil defense natters--one on her plans for response to a tornado, and the other on their plans for coping with a nuclear attack. These 
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discussions'were tape-recorded and brought back to 1'1chigan State.
Each tapei was transcribed; the transcriptions were content analyzed to identify the major themes, issues, problems and uncertainties that arose during the discussions of disaster topics.
I
Willingness to Share Home Basement Shelters
In the Phase I telephone survey, respondents were asked questions about the willingness of their neighbors to share basements with both their neighbors, and with strangers, in the event of a community disaster. In addition, the respondents were also asked about how willing they themselves were to share their own Jf homes with strangers, or to seek shelter in the home of another neighbor.
The questions were asked in this manner for several reasons.
First of all, the respondent's perception of their neighbors' willing-
IL
ness to share will undoubtedly have some effect on his or her own willingness to go to that neighbor and ask to share the home.
Secondly, in questions concerning willingness to share with others, there is a strong bias operating toward the more "socially acceptable
answer," i.e., a definite pressure to say you are willing to share.
By asking what the respondent believes others would do, the social bias is partially reduced and the respondent should feel less pressure to give a socially acceptable answer and should be more likely to
give a response that reflects not only his neighbor's attitudes but his own as well. Although it is often difficult to determine the exact effect of this bias, the actual willingness of people to share with strangers is probably best measured by looking at both what they say others will do as well as what they say they themselves -5- will do. Therefore, if we are interested in an overall level of willingness, it probably lies somewhere between the two levels of responses.
In the telephone interviews, respondents were specifically asked: The responses to these two questions are shown in Table 1 below. While these results show a general overall willingness to share, there are some notable differences, depending on the type of person asking to share and how we interpret the data. For example, if we combine the categories of very and fairly willing, we find that four out of five (82%) persons believed their neighbors would be willing to share with other neighbors. For strangers, three out of five (58%) feel others would be willing to share.
On the other hand, if we interpret the fairly willing categorny as a conditional one, i.e., "maybe they will and maybe they won't," and therefore only consider the very willing responses, the pattern changes markedly. Now we find that three out of five (not four out of five) are very willing to share with neighbors.
Less than half that number--30%--show that level of enthusiasm for sharing with strangers. In addition, where only 10% respond to the query about sharing with neighbors by saying it "Depends on who it is" or "Don't know, can't say," 25% indicated that their willingness to share with strangers would be determined by "who it was," or other situational factors. A similar study conducted nationally by researchers at the University of Pittsburgh also found a high proportion (90%) of persons willing to share their home with others in their general neighborhood. 3 In addition, two other questions about home sharing were asked:
1. "How willing would you be to share your home with a stranger in case of a disaster?':
and secondly, 2. "If you thought another house in your neighborhood offered much better shelter than yours, how willing would you be to go to that house and ask to share it?"
The responses to these two questions are shown in Table 2 . Here again we clearly see that a very large proportion of the general public testifies that it is willing to share with strangers.
About four in five (78%) are willing to share (if we combine both the "very"i and '-somewhat willing" categories). If on the other hand, we consider the "very willing" category as the most stable one, we then find that only about half (54%) report a willingness to share with strangers. The reader might also note that "ile 58% said people in their neighborhood would share with a stranger, 78%
of the respondents said they themselves would share.
Would people go to someone else's home? About seven out of 10 (70%) indicated some degree of willingness to do so, but only half (48%) stated that they were very willing to do so. It is also interesting to note here that 17%, or about one out of five persons, indicated that they were not willing to do so. Although this is not a major proportion it still represents a sizeable number of people.
In the lichigan Studies, we found only one out of 20 not willing. 4 4 Berlo, p, 5. family members, particularly the spouse. Both factors--complexity, and the appropriateness of the response to the actual decisionmaking process--suggest that the whole issue of home sharing is a much more difficult one to treat than the earlier research would indicate. For these reasons, then, we will turn next to our indepth discussion with husband-wife couples.
K__

Factors Influencing Disaster Preparedness
The data for this portion of the report were collected during the Spring of 1972. To be eligible for tha Phase II portion of the study, respondents from the Phase I telephone survey had to meet two criteria: in addition to being married, the family must have had at leas one child under 12..years of age. Out of the 400 telephone respondents, 141 families met the above criteria. Of that number 65 were interviewed, 33 were not at the residence where they were contacted in the winter for Phase I or were not available during the three week field interviewing period, and 44 declined to take part in the study. A major reason for not participating in these interviews was the difficulty many couples had in finding time they were together that they were willing to devote to the interview. All families were contacted personally, given an introdufitory letter concerning the purpose of the study and told that they would receive ten dollars for participation in the study.
Two types of information were obtained in the interview. Each person filled out a self-report questionanire concerning how things were done in the family. Then, each couple was given four topics to discuss and asked to talk with each other about the issues involved. Two of these topics dealt with family behavior in disasterrelated situations. In one they were told that they had 15 minutes to prepare for a tornado and to discuss with one another the family's plans for protection. In the other, they were given a nuclear emergency situation and told that they would have two hours to prepare for the arrival of nuclear fallout. All the discussions were tape-recorded. Th-2 information contained in the remainder of the present report has been drawn from those dialogues between ;iarital partners. 1-1. *You hear hoty terrible they are but never havina seen one or anything like that I don't realJv take them seriously I guess. In addition to those people who can't really see it happening to them, there are those who can but would rather not, because it is uncomfortable to think about: -I. "I've never allowed myself to think about it too much. I just never allowed mjself to dwell on it."
Another situation which helps support the idea that "those things don't really happen to us," especially in the case of tornadoes, is the very frequent occurrance of tornado "warnings" and %tatches."
From our interviews, it appears that a large proportion of the public disregard such warnings as commonplace, everyday occurrances.
U. "But as I say this has happened time and again, I don't know that there's ever been a season, that we haven't had three, four or five or more tornado warnings and everyone, oh they get a little excited about it, but it's all talk. Nobody ever does anything. Have you ever known anyone to really take precautions for a tornado?" One of the results of frequent alerts and no tcrnado is to reinforce the notion that "those things don't really happen to us,"
with the end result a decreased willingness to develop disaster plans and to take precautionary measures.
Also involved in this overall factor is the tendency of people to feel that tornadoes are very isolated occurrances and therefore, have a low probability of affecting them, if indeed, at all.
H. "Even if the tornado came, they're so locailized that the chances of one actually hitting our house are so small, there's no more cause for worrying than worrying about a truck running over your car out in the highway."
W. "A tornado warning somehow is the sort of thing -that happens to them and not us."
Therefore, if people cannot conceive of a specific disaster as happening to them, are not threatened by it, or view the probability of it as extremely remote, it seems likely that they will not develop specific shelter plans and/or implement them adequately.
A second factor which appears equally important in deteimining H. "We keep telling them that when they get so close, they will change the pattern on the picture tube. The television will pick it up and let you know and the automobile radio will pick them up."
Others indicated that they would more like]y hear the warning sirens, but once again some voiced the 'disregard" with which warnings, signals, and alerts are treated.
H. "You hear the sirens, the test sirens all the time and, like most people, you figure it's just another test siren, and...when it's the real thing, unless you have a radio, or a radio on, or you get a phone call, you're not really going to know."
How they would gt___together. An issue which received much attention in :amily discussions was the question of how family members would get together -would assemble in time of disaster. The three situations which were described most frequently were: (1) hueband at work, (2) children at school, and (3) children out of the home on errands or playing. Although this issue appeared to be most salient in nuclear emergency discussions, several questions about tornadoes seemed important.
First of all, parents were generally ignorant of whether their children's school had adequate shelter facilities or disaster plans in the event of a tornado; thus, a number of wives indicated that they would go to the school and get their children. Secondly, if the children were outside playing and away from the home, many parents said that, although they had not told their children what to do specifically in the event of a tornado, the children had been told to come home when a storm approached. Others stated that they would "call around' in hopes of locating their child or expressed the hope that someone would "take him in."
In regard to nuclear emergency, the issue of how the family
Iwould get together was a highly important one. Almost without exception, the wives expressed the idea that they felt totally un- . By and large, Vhen couples talked about where they 4 jwould go in the event of a disaster, they rarely mentioned public shelters. Even when they did, they tended to raise the issue of "How many people could a public shelter hold?' When measured against the population of the city, they felt that either the shelter would be overcrowded and they themselves would not be able to get in, or that the shelters .were probably unprepared for a calamity the magnitude of a nuclear fallout.
H. "Imagine I would be more prepared to go to the city's buildings ...where they're supposedly stocked for a disaster and whether they are or not I don't know. This is something...I think Civil Defense hasn't been taken too
In the case of a tornado, those families which indicated they would leave their home in preference for a public building usually II said that they would go to a neighborhood church or school regardless of whether it was an authorized CD shelter. Usually these were families without home basements.
Another surprisingly common solution in both the case of the tornado and nuclear fallout was the decision to get into the family to families is if a tornado occurred while the family is asleen, and hence arrived with virtually no warning. Some indicated that they would roll under the bed, but most felt powerless and fatalistic about their welfare.
"
The thing that would worry me is like if you were sleeping. This -ype of thing. Well, I guess there's nothing to worry about. I'd be over with."
Mat to take with them. In the event of a tornado, most couples stated that they would take a varied range of things tc the basement with them. Among those most frequently mentioned were: cookies, croackers or games to occupy the children, pillows for the children, canned foods, water and blankets.
Other things which were mentioned, but much less frequently, were firstaid kits, flashhlights, transistor radios, and tools.
In the nuclear emergency, supplies bocamne a much more important issue, and most families recognized the need to have large amounts of food and water because of the possibility of a long period of confinement, including problems from contamination of outside water or food sources.
A few indicated that they would take garbage cans or buckets to be used as sanitary containers and almost all indicated that they would take a transistor radio in order to keep informed. Very few dealt with the issue of radiation and what that would do not only to their supplies, but to themselves as well.
How to protect themselves from the effects of the specific disaster.
In regard to tornados, three issues seemed to be of.most concern to families: electrical or gas fires, being trapped inside the ruins of the home, and how to cut down on flying glass. Although some families saw the need to shut off electricity and gas jets, and to stay away from windows, most families were primarily concerned with what a tornado would do to their home, whether or not they'd be trapped in the ruins, and how a tornado actually caused its damage.
There was a large amount of discussion about what to do with the windows and as in the issue of "which corner of the basement is the safest," there was a wide range of opin'pn about which windows were to be opened, how much and why this was an important thing to do. In regard to nuclear emergencies, most families were even less knowledgeable about what to do and why they should do it. Although a few families indicated that they would fill the basement window wells with dirt to partially prevent radiation from entering the home, most families were unprepared to discuss how they would protect themselves from the effects of radioactive fallout.
The general lack of understanding about radiation was evidenced by When families discussed the possibility of going to someone else's home, some felt they would rather stay in their own home (even though with poorer protection) than take a chance of being rejected. Another attitude equally common was a reluctance to be dependent on someone else, even if survival may be involved.
H. "Even if you'd go there we don't know them that well, that we could really say for sure we'd get in. So, probably just stay in the center of the house and..."
W. "No. I wouldn't take a chance on going out and being turned away anywhere."
L
In drawing some conclusions about the overall level of awareness of behavioral alternatives, one factor should be kept in mind in regard to the sample population. Since these families had been recipients of CSP materials, and were included in the Phase I portion of the study, where
they were questioned about a number of disaster preparedness topics, we would expect them to be, if anything, more informed than the rest of the general public and therefore more likely to have a higher level of competence in both general disaster knowledge and the ability to formulate specific disaster plans.
The overall conclusion we must reach from the generality, vagueness and inaccurate replies of the families interviewed is that the majority of them have an insufficient level of awareness to deal at all effectively with disaster situations.
Two Summary Factors Influencing Preparedness Levels
Thus far, we have dealt with the major areas where public attitudes and knowledge are important in determining whether or not families deve 1 e specific plans for handling disasters. Next, let us take a closer look at two major factors which seem to explain our earlier observations:
1.
Personal Saliency --whether families can conceptually deal with the possibility of the disaster as potentially happening to them; e.g., whether their attitude is "It could happen to us" or "I can't see it happening to us". Obviously, if families cannot conceptualize a nuclear attack or tornado as actually happening to them, then it is unlikely that they will either expose themselves -to disaster preparedness information or develop specific plans for coping with it. situations, then it is unlikely that they will be able to develop specific plans.
In order to see how these factors might operate jointly, and the kinds of public attitudes that might result from different combinations, let us examine a more graphic representation of both factors. see Table 3 .
In reviewing what families generally said to us in the interviews, coupled with the fact that few families indicated that they had specific disaster plans, we can conclude that very few families fall into the High Saliency-High Awareness cell (A-highest level of preparedness).
And according to our view, both high saliency and high awareness are necessary conditions to achieve any sophistication in disaster planning.
Most families fall into cells C and D.
Suggestions for New Information "Packages" According to our model, then, if we want to raise the overall levels of both awareness of behavioral alternatives and personal saliency, what specifically can we do so that families are more likgly to be prepared and to formulate disaster plans?
First of all, in regard to awareness, the ligency should consider directing its public communication efforts to answering the specific questions which people have. For tornadoes, the most frequently asked questions were (not in order of priority): The form in which this information should be presented is extremely important in determining how it will be received and processed by the We suggested the gummed back cardboard so that it could be put up on a basement wall or basement cupboard and therefore be readily visible, yet less likely to be lost or throwm away. If you are interested in improving the overall level of disaster preparedness, "then emphasize precautions against the specific dis.aster which is the greatest actual threat to th>t community, the one which people have some experience with and can relate to.
Summary and Discussion
This report draws on several data sources, each of which includes a segment related to family communication and decision processes about plans for both natural and nuclear disasters. From the telephone interviews we learned that respondents in the Dayton,
Ohio area are much like people interviewed elsewhere in the United
States: they are generally willing to testify to -their endorsement of the concept of home basement use and sharing when disasters occur.
Our concern, however, has not primarily been to replicate this finding. We were more interested in the interactive and dynamic are of cent-pal importance in any message that the Agency puts out about these issues. These are probably not the only important questions, but they do seem to be the main ones we have encountered.
Devising good answers (in terms of accurate content) to these questions is certainly not an easy task, but is one that the Agency has addressed quite often previously. Devising good cormunication strategies for disseminating these answers is a task the Agency has attempted on several occasions, and whose results we have critiqued on several occasions. The main result of that activity should be the recognition on the Agency's part that our experiences should be input to the development phase of the communication program, rather than be used only in an after-the-fact evaluation capability.
